Class 22: The (Fiduciary) Obligations of Corporate Management #3
Today’s video and slides… jon
7.2 Is Apple Cooked?
In practical terms, we know that shareholder dissatisfaction with management in a publicly traded company is most often registered through withdrawal, at least where there is a market to sell shares. On a practical level, Cook isn’t suggesting anything unusual when he tells dissenting shareholders to sell their stock if they don’t like what he’s […]
If a corporation is a person, then can it break its collarbone?
Something I was thinking about while I was doing the assignment: how does the rule from Stilk v Myrick play into directors transferring their powers to officers? Take, for example, the scenario from assignment #2. A sole director transferring his powers to a sole officer. Officers derive their powers from directors–essentially, any powers they possess […]
7.5 Duty Free? Fat chance
The decision in Regal is quite annoying, given that the entire situation could have been avoided in a simple way. According to Lord Russell in Regal, the directors could have, had they wished, have “protected themselves by a resolution (either antecedent or subsequent) of the Regal share-holders in general meeting”. Given that these directors were […]
Discussion Activity 7.1
To briefly share my views on the discussion presented re: Peoples v Wise, I will turn to the three questions presented in the discussion activity. Consider the impact of board meetings by telephone. Soper v Canada tells us that although a director is not obliged to give his continuous attention to the company and therefore […]
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